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Compared to adults, relatively little is known about autobiographical memory and the ability to imag-
ine ﬁctitious and future scenarios in school-aged children, despite the importance of these functions for
development and subsequent independent living. Even less is understood about the effect of early hip-
pocampal damage on children’s memory and imagination abilities. To bridge this gap, we devised a novel
naturalistic autobiographicalmemory task that enabledus to formally assess thememory for recent auto-
biographical experiences in healthy school-aged children. Contemporaneous with the autobiographical
memories being formed, the children also imagined anddescribedﬁctitious scenarios. Having established
the performance of healthy school-aged children on these tasks,weproceeded tomake comparisonswith
children (n=21) who had experienced neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia, and consequent bilateral hippocam-
pal damage. Our results showed that healthy children could recall autobiographical events, includinghildren
evelopmental amnesia
spatiotemporal information and speciﬁc episodic details. By contrast, children who had experienced
neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia had impaired recall, with the speciﬁc details of episodes being lost. Despite
this signiﬁcant memory deﬁcit they were able to construct ﬁctitious scenarios. This is in clear contrast to
adults with hippocampal damage, who typically have impaired autobiographical memory and deﬁcits in
the construction of ﬁctitious and future scenarios. We speculate that the paediatric patients’ relatively
intact semantic memory and/or some functionality in their residual hippocampi may underpin their
.scene construction ability
. Introduction
Being able to recall the past and imagine and plan for the future
re prerequisites for independent living. The hippocampus is part
f a network of brain regions that supports the retrieval of autobi-
graphical memories (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001;
preng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006).
unctional MRI (fMRI) ﬁndings have indicated the hippocam-
us is also involved in imagining ﬁctitious episodes (Hassabis,
umaran, & Maguire, 2007a; Summerﬁeld, Hassabis, & Maguire,
009, 2010), and the simulation of personal future events (e.g.
ddis & Schacter, 2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Addis,
an, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning,
008; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007).
urther neuropsychological evidence for this comes from Hassabis,
umaran, Vann, andMaguire (2007b), (see alsoAndelman,Hooﬁen,
oldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom,
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 78337457; fax: +44 20 78131445.
E-mail address: e.maguire@ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk (E.A. Maguire).
028-3932/© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.03.008© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.
2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; but see Squire et al., 2010, and
Maguire & Hassabis, 2011 for a response) who tested patients
with bilateral hippocampal damage that was acquired in adult-
hood, rendering them amnesic. They were asked to imagine and
describe ﬁctitious scenarios and also possible plausible future
episodes. The patient group was signiﬁcantly impaired relative to
control participants on both tasks, and a possible source for their
deﬁcit was identiﬁed. While patients were able to produce rele-
vant details when asked to imagine, their scene descriptions lacked
spatial coherence and were fragmented. It was concluded that the
hippocampus may play a critical role in imagination by binding
together the disparate elements of an event or scene in a process
called scene construction (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993; Hassabis
& Maguire, 2007, 2009; Hassabis et al., 2007b; O’Keefe & Nadel,
1978; see Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007 for other
views).Whilst Hassabis et al. (2007b) documented impairment of scene
constructionassociatedwithadult-onset amnesiaandbilateralhip-
pocampal damage, it was recently reported that another patient
with selective hippocampal lesions and developmental amnesia
(DA; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997) was unimpaired on the scene
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onstruction task (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010).
on, nowanadult, sustainedhishippocampalpathologyperinatally,
nd showed the symptoms of DA from early childhood. His ability
odescribedetailedﬁctitious and future scenarios stands inmarked
ontrast to the patients whose hippocampal damage and amnesia
ere acquired in adulthood (Hassabis et al., 2007b). Maguire et al.
2010) noted that Jon’s intact scene construction could be due to
he effortful strategies he had developed over the years to assist
ith imagination, perhaps relying on his well-developed semantic
emory store, reﬂecting plastic changes in response to the neona-
al hypoxic/ischaemic insults which may have ameliorated some
f the effects of early hippocampal damage. Also, Jon’s preserved
cene construction could be associated with residual hippocampal
unction, given that his remaining hippocampal tissue activated
uring fMRI when he recalled the few autobiographical memo-
ies that he retains (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001).
y contrast another, now adult, DA patient HC (Case E6 in Vargha-
hadem et al., 2003; DA6 in Adlam, Vargha Khadem, Mishkin, &
e Haan, 2005; Adlam, Malloy, Mishkin, & Vargha-Khadem, 2009)
as recently reported to be impaired at simulating personal future
vents (Kwan et al., 2010). The test used differed somewhat from
hat employed by Hassabis et al. (2007b) and Maguire et al. (2010),
n that there were fewer trials, there was no spatial coherence
easure, and the focus was on internal and external details – a
egacy of the test’s origins in the autobiographical memory litera-
ure. We suggest that this test may not be the most appropriate
eans of assessing the subtleties of imagination/simulation in
atients. To examine this assertion directly, a study is currently
nderway in which patient HC’s performance on the Hassabis
t al. (2007b) test is being investigated (E.A. Maguire personal
ommunication).
Given the uncertain status of scene construction/simulation in
he context of single case studies of patients with DA, a large sam-
le of children with neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia and associated
ippocampal damage and memory impairment is required to eval-
ate the contributions of age and experience to processes involved
n scene construction. In order to assess how children with hip-
ocampal damage performon autobiographicalmemory and scene
onstruction tasks, it is necessary to compare such a patient group
o healthy control children.
Surprisingly, studies of autobiographical memory in school-
ged children and adolescents are fewer than those in adults. Bauer,
urch, Scholin, and Güler (2007) suggest that children between the
ges of 7 and 10 years give mainly gist or fact-based information
hen recalling personal events and often do not provide details
ertaining to who was present, or the spatiotemporal context of
n event. Developmental changes to regions of the brain such as
he frontal lobes, areas associated with retrieval abilities and exec-
tive functions in adolescence (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen,
006; Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003), may account
or the increase in contextual information observed (Pasupathi &
ainryb, 2010; Piolino et al., 2007) in older children’s narratives
f autobiographical events, an ability that has been found to con-
inue to develop along with self-awareness through adolescence
nd into early adulthood (McLean, 2005; Pasupathi & Wainryb,
010; for a review see Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009).
icard, Reffuveille, Eustache, and Piolino (2010) also suggested the
evelopment of episodic event memory is linked to an increased
fﬁciency of cognitive abilities, although little is knownabout other
rocesses, such as scene construction, that may be involved. Thus,
he relatively limited literature suggests that school-aged children
nd adolescents are able to recall everyday memories. While work
s starting to emerge on future-oriented thinking in pre-schoolers
e.g. Atance & Jackson, 2009; Atance & Meltoff, 2006; Grant &
uddendorf, 2010; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011) much
ess has been documented formally about the ability of school-gia 49 (2011) 1843–1850
aged children and adolescents to construct imagined scenes and
scenarios.
We therefore set out to examine a number of key issues. First,
we devised a novel autobiographical memory task that enabled us
to formally assessmemory for recent autobiographical experiences
in a group (n=12) of healthy school-aged children. This ecologically
valid task involved spending the day with each child during which
a series of (unbeknownst to them) pre-planned ‘events’ occurred,
memory forwhichwasassessedon the subsequentday in a surprise
recall test. In this way, each child underwent the same controlled
yet naturalistic protocol to examine autobiographical recall, and
our novel analysis method enabled different aspects of autobio-
graphical recollection to be documented. Contemporaneous with
the autobiographical memories being formed, the children also
imagined and described ﬁctitious scenarios in an adaptation of the
Hassabis et al. (2007b) paradigm. Having recorded performance on
the autobiographicalmemory recall and scene construction tests in
healthy school-aged children, and adding to the literature thereon,
we proceeded to compare the performance of the young healthy
controls to that of a group of children who had been exposed
to neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia with concomitant selective bilat-
eral hippocampal volume loss, the majority of whom had memory
problems. We report data from the largest group of such patients
yet identiﬁed (n=21) allowing us to establish with conﬁdence the
boundarieswithinwhich their autobiographicalmemory recall and
scene construction abilities operate.
We hypothesised that the healthy control school-aged chil-
dren would perform with high accuracy on the autobiographical
memory retrieval test, and that they would provide rich descrip-
tions of imagined scenarios. Given their hippocampal pathology,
impairments on standard memory tests, and reports from par-
ents of everyday memory problems, we expected the patient
group to be impaired in autobiographical memory recall, similar to
patients with adult-acquired selective hippocampal damage hav-
ing resulted in amnesia. Regarding scene construction, the question
waswhether theywould show the same intact proﬁle asDApatient
Jon, or resemble the impaired adult patients with amnesia?
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-onepatients (13male;meanage13.29years; SD2.49; range9–18years;
3 left handed) participated, each of whom had suffered neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia
due to cardiorespiratory disease. They were all born at term, had no neurodevel-
opmental abnormalities, were free of genetic syndromes, and were native English
speakers. Twelve healthy control participants (6 male; mean age 12.33 years; SD
2.06; range 9–15 years; 2 left handed) also took part. All participants and their
parents gave informed written consent to participate in the study in accordance
with the regulations of the local research ethics committees. There was no signif-
icant difference between the groups in terms of age (t=−1.12, P=0.27). Parental
occupation was classiﬁed according to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of
Occupation (ISCO-88) and then transformed into an International Socio-Economic
Index of Occupational Status, which provides socio-economic values for parental
occupations. There was no signiﬁcant difference between the patients and controls
for socioeconomic status (t=1.27, P=0.22).
All participants were assessed for verbal, nonverbal and overall intelligence
(Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, Full Scale IQ; Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
4th Ed.), verbal ﬂuency (subtest of the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System),
and every day memory, working memory and attention (General Memory, Work-
ing Memory, Attention/Concentration; Children’s Memory Scale) (see Fig. 1). The
scores of the control group were at the high end of the average range (i.e. from 8
to 13 points above the standard mean of 100), and consequently higher than the
scores of the patients which were within the average range and only 3–5 points
below the standard population mean. When FSIQ was controlled for, there were no
differences between the two groups on any measure except on every day memory
(see Fig. 1); this was also the case when verbal and performance IQs were examined
separately. Of note, neither age nor IQ correlated signiﬁcantlywith any of the exper-
imental measures of recall and scene construction. This accords with previous use
of the scene construction test (Hassabis et al., 2007), where background participant
characteristics such as age and IQ did not affect scores on this task.
J.M. Cooper et al. / Neuropsycholo
Fig. 1. Mean scores (±1 standard error) for the controls and patients on baseline
neuropsychological measures. Comparisons of mean scores between the controls
and patients showed a signiﬁcant difference, with the controls consistently scor-
ing higher than the patients, although the magnitude of this difference was far
greater in the domain of every day memory. Of note, the patients did not differ
signiﬁcantly from the population mean (100) of these standardised tests on any
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During this ﬁrst day, eachparticipant alsoperformed the scene construction task
F
leasure except every day memory (P<0.0001). FSIQ= full scale IQ, VIQ=verbal
Q; PIQ=performance IQ; WM=working memory; Attn = attention; MQ=memory
uotient (see text for details of the test instruments).Wholebrain structuralMRI scanswere obtained for eachparticipant using a1.5T
iemens Avanto Scanner, with a T1-weighted 3D FLASH sequence with the follow-
ng parameters: repetition time 11ms, echo time 4.94ms, ﬂip angle 15◦; matrix size
24×256; in-plane resolution 1mm×1mm;partition thickness 1mm; 176 sagittal
artitions in the third dimension; acquisition time 5.34min; no gap. The scans were
ig. 2. The top panels show MRI T1 images from an example control participant (C) and a
ower panel shows the mean (±standard error) left and right hippocampal volumes for cogia 49 (2011) 1843–1850 1845
examinedbyanexperiencedpaediatricneuroradiologist to screen fordetectable sig-
nal abnormality, space occupying lesions, or volume loss (other than hippocampal)
across the whole brain. No consistent abnormalities outside of the medial tempo-
ral lobe were found. For the measurement of hippocampal volumes, the data were
reformatted into 1mm-thick contiguous slices in a tilted coronal plane perpendic-
ular to the long axis of the hippocampus. Hippocampal cross-sectional areas were
measured in all slices along the entire length of the hippocampus, using MEDx 3.43
(Medical Numerics, Inc., Maryland, USA) software. The volumes were calculated by
summing the cross-sectional areas and multiplying by the distance between the
slices. Corrections, derived from the regression line of control hippocampal volume
versus intracranial volume, were then made for intracranial volume. Bilateral dam-
age to the hippocampi was conﬁrmed for the patient group (see Fig. 2), with a mean
hippocampal volume bilaterally of 2550mm3 (SD 386), compared to 3339mm3 (SD
213) in the control group, a 21% reduction (t=5.50, P=0.001).
2.2. Tasks and procedures
Testing took place over two days. On day 1, each participant took part in events
that (unbeknownst to them) followed a scripted protocol. There were 13 events in
total, 10 that were used for the main experiment, and 3 for practice trials during
recall. The events (e.g. choosing a snack, drawing a complicated picture) were found
during pilot testing to ﬁt seamlessly into a day of neuropsychological assessments.
Piloting also revealed through participant ratings that all events were similar in
their level of difﬁculty and memorability, as well as ensuring they were not emo-
tive or obscure. Using discrete but thorough notes taken during the events, the
experimenter chose the 10 events that contained full, clear and detailed actions
and interactions to use in the memory test on day 2. All participants were unaware
theywould be asked to recall the events on the following day, or of the experimenter
taking notes.modelled on that of Hassabis et al. (2007b); see also Maguire et al., 2010). Each par-
ticipant was tested individually and sat facing the experimenter. The session was
digitally recorded. The instructions were explained to the participant and exam-
ples were given. During this practice session, the experimenter continued until they
were satisﬁed that the participant had fully understood what was required of them.
n age and gender matched patient (P), with the hippocampi outlined in green. The
ntrol and patient groups.
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Table 1
Recall of autobiographical events.
Measure Mean (SD)
Patients (n=20) Controls (n=12)
Event description 9.05 (1.64) 9.58 (0.67)
Location/time 6.10 (1.94)* 7.67 (2.71)
four main categories: the number of entities present (EP), sensory
descriptions (SD), thoughts, emotions and actions (TEA) and spatial
references (SPA). Hassabis et al. (2007b) found that the production
of 7 details per category was an optimal reﬂection of performance
Table 2
Performance on the scene construction task.
Measure Mean (SD)
Patients (n=21) Controls (n=12)
Content
Spatial references 3.35 (1.41) 4.01 (1.44)
Entities present 5.92 (0.92) 6.40 (0.50)
Sensory descriptions 5.34 (1.36) 5.97 (1.46)846 J.M. Cooper et al. / Neurops
cenarios were chosen that would be suitable for school-aged children (e.g. camp-
ng, kite-ﬂying); they were neither fantasy-based nor too similar to events that had
appened to them in the past. When participants constructed an imagined scene,
hey rated how similar it was to actual memory or part of a memory on a scale of 1
nothing like a memory) . . . 5 (very like a memory). Only those scenes that scored
or 2 on this scale were considered for inclusion (mean of ﬁnal 10 scenarios: con-
rols 1.54; patients 1.19). For each scenario a short description was read aloud by
he experimenter from a prepared script (e.g. “Imagine you are by a campﬁre in
he mountains”) and the participant was to close their eyes and vividly imagine the
ituation from the cue and describe it out loud in as much detail as possible. Par-
icipants were told not to recall personal memories but create something that was
ompletely new. Theywere told to verbalise their imagined experience until it came
o a natural end or they felt no more details could be given. The experimenter could
se general probes to encourage the participants (e.g. “can you see anything else?”),
owever it was strictly prohibited to introduce any idea, concept, entity or detail
hat had not already been mentioned by the participant. After each scenario was
ecorded, participants were asked to rate it according to a number of different cri-
eria (see Section 3). At various points during the trial and before the post-scenario
atings, the experimenter conﬁrmed that the participant was still familiar with the
ask instructions, the scenario in question, and the scenario that had been created.
On day 2, each participant was asked to recall out loud, one at a time, and in as
uch detail as possible, each of the ten events from the previous day in response to
hort verbal cues (e.g. “recall choosing a snack”). Also on day 2 theywere required to
ecall out loud in as much detail as possible the ten imagined scenarios from the day
efore. All descriptions of imagined events on day 1 and real and imagined events on
ay 2 were recorded, anonymised and then transcribed (blindly) by a professional
ranscription company.
.3. Scoring
Scoring is described in the Section 3. As some scores were based on the experi-
enter’s ratings, and the primary experimenter was not blind to participant status,
our subjects were selected at random (2 patients and 2 controls; 12% of the data)
nd their data scored by a second experimenter who was blind to participant iden-
ity. Cronbach’s Alpha was used to assess inter-rater reliability. To summarise, all
xperimental measures were above 0.7 (range 0.855–0.921) which is considered to
ndicate reliability (de Vaus, 2002; Gliem & Gliem, 2003). There were no signiﬁcant
ifferences in reliability for subjective ratings and content measures.
.4. Statistical analysis
The two groups [patients (n=21) and controls (n=12)] were compared using
range of statistical tests: t-tests, analysis of covariance with age as a continu-
us variable, where appropriate non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test, and partial
orrelations controlling for participant age; a signiﬁcance threshold of P<0.05 was
pplied throughout. As described above, there were unequal numbers in the two
roups. In order to verify that this did not inﬂuence the results, we selected 12
atients at random and compared them with the 12 control participants on the
xperimental recall measures and the scene construction task. The same pattern of
esults that we report in the Section 3 was found, and at the same statistical thresh-
ld as the main analyses, including the signiﬁcant correlations with hippocampal
olume.
. Results
.1. Recall of autobiographical events
Although the patients’ selective memory problems had been
dentiﬁed on baseline neuropsychological assessments, we ﬁrst
anted to establish how they would perform on a novel natural-
stic autobiographical memory recall task. Having been exposed
o events on day 1, recall for these autobiographical episodes was
ssessed on day 2. Note that one patient, while following the pro-
ocol of day 1, was not available to test on day 2 and so recall on
ay 2 was examined in 20 patients.
Recall of each of the ten autobiographical events was assessed
sing three criteria (each scoring 1 or 0 points). First, we assessed
hether a participant could give an overall description of the event
n response to a retrieval cue (e.g. “recall choosing a snack”). In
rder to assess speciﬁc episodic details, two other criteria were
onsidered. Spatiotemporal information about the location and/or
ime of the event, and speciﬁc details of the episode that could
ot be inferred from the retrieval cue (this included details such
s thoughts, actions or dialogues that occurred during the event,
hich were noted covertly by the experimenter at the time, andEpisodic details 3.70 (2.66)* 5.83 (2.66)
Scorer accuracy rating 5.95 (2.10)* 7.77 (1.03)
* Signiﬁcantly different to controls.
occurred in all cases). Finally, a scorer rated how well they felt
the details provided by the participant reﬂected the actual event
that had taken place on the previous day. This accuracy rating was
between 0 (indicating the construction was completely devoid of
details pertaining to the eventwith no sense of recollection) and 10
(indicating an extremely rich and vivid recollection). Table 1 shows
the mean scores on the autobiographical recall measures.
Patients and controls provided similar event descriptions
(F=0.76; P=0.39). By contrast, controls were signiﬁcantly bet-
ter at recalling the speciﬁc information that located an event in
time and place (F=4.32; P=0.047). Moreover, patients were sig-
niﬁcantly poorer than controls at recalling the detailed episodic
information that made an event unique (F=5.16; P=0.031). Com-
bined with the signiﬁcantly poorer accuracy ratings ascribed to
their recall (F=6.64; P=0.015), the patients’ impaired recollec-
tion of spatiotemporal and episodic details conﬁrms that the
children exposed to neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia and concomitant
hippocampal damage had a clear deﬁcit in autobiographical event
recall.
3.2. Scene construction
Having conﬁrmed that autobiographical event memory recall
was signiﬁcantly impaired in the patients, we then examined their
ability to imagine ﬁctitious scenarios. Their descriptions of newly
constructed experiences created onday1were analysed in termsof
three components: content, participant ratings and spatial coher-
ence. These componentshadpreviouslybeen identiﬁedbyHassabis
et al. (2007b) when assessing scene construction in healthy and
amnesic adults (see also Maguire et al., 2010). A similar scoring
protocol was employed here with some adjustments to suit paedi-
atric participants (see Section 2.2). See Table 2 for the mean scores
on the scene construction measures.
3.2.1. Content
Each scenario description was segmented into a set of state-
ments. Every statement was then classiﬁed as belonging to one ofThoughts, emotions, actions 4.53 (1.34) 5.56 (1.28)
Participant ratings
Sense of presence 1.31 (0.28) 1.16 (0.17)
Perceived salience 4.18 (0.64) 4.00 (0.85)
Spatial coherence index 3.64 (1.44) 4.31 (1.33)
J.M. Cooper et al. / Neuropsychologia 49 (2011) 1843–1850 1847
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designed to examine the extent to which a recalled scenario
reﬂected that which was imagined in the original construction.
For each scenario, the scorer gave a rating between 0 and 10 (0
– ‘no similarity to original construction’ . . . 10 – ‘virtually iden-
Table 3
Recall of imagined scenarios.
Measure Mean (SD)
Patients (n=20) Controls (n=12)
Content
Spatial references 2.12 (0.95) 2.60 (1.13)
Entities present 4.82 (1.45) 5.57 (1.09)Fig. 3. Example transcripts from
hile ensuring that those with more circuitous descriptions were
ot unfairly advantaged. Thus, the score for each detail category
as capped at a maximum of 7 (of note, the results were highly
imilar when the uncapped data were used). Compared to controls,
atients produced a similar amount of each statement type and
here were no signiﬁcant group differences (EP F=2.63, P=0.114;
D F=2.41, P=0.131; TEA F=4.04, P=0.054; SPA F=1.82, P=0.187).
ee Fig. 3 for example scenario descriptions.
.2.2. Participant ratings
Oncompletionof each imagined construction, participantswere
sked to rate their perceived salience from 1 to 5 (1 – ‘couldn’t
eally see anything’ . . . 5 – ‘extremely vivid’) to determine how
ivid a scene had been in their mind while they were imagining
t. They were also asked to rate their sense of presence from 0 to
(0 – ‘did not feel like I was there at all’ . . . 2 – ‘felt like I was
eally there’). There was no difference between the controls and
he patients on either self-rated measure, with both groups feeling
hey were present within the scenario and that the scene was vivid
n their mind (salience F=0.65, P=0.43; presence F=2.69, P=0.11).
.2.3. Spatial coherence index
As part of the feedback on each scenario, participants were
resented with a set of 12 statements each providing a possi-
le qualitative description of the newly constructed experience.
articipants were instructed to indicate the statements they felt
ccurately described their construction. They were free to iden-
ify as many or as few statements as they thought appropriate. Of
he 12 statements, 4 of them directly suggested a scene was frag-
ented, 4 directly suggested a scene was coherent, and 4 spoke
o other aspects of the scene not necessarily related to its coher-
nce – but which were more likely to be chosen if the scene
as coherent. Thus, the number of direct statements relating to
oherence/fragmentationwas the same. No participant chose all 12
tatements, nor did they select directly contradictory statements.
ne point was awarded for each integrated statement selected and
ne point taken away for each fragmented statement. This yielded
score between −4 and +8 that was then normalised around zero
o give ﬁnal Spatial Coherence Index score ranging between −6
totally fragmented) and +6 (completely integrated). Any construc-
ion with a negative Spatial Coherence Index was considered to be
ncoherent and fragmented. Both groups produced coherent con-
tructions, and there was no signiﬁcant difference between the
roups (F=1.23, P=0.28).cene construction task on day 1.
Finally, we also assessed the difﬁculty of scene construction.
Each participant was asked to give a rating between 1 and 5 (1
– ‘no difﬁculty’ . . . 5 – ‘it was very difﬁcult’) on the completion of
each scenario. Controls and patients did not differ (means: controls
1.88; patients 1.93; F=0.25, P=0.62), with both groups ﬁnding the
task easy to perform.
3.3. Recall of imagined scenarios
Having observed a clear difference in the patients between their
impaired autobiographical memory recall and their intact ability
to imagine ﬁctitious scenarios, we then wondered how they would
perform when asked to recall the imagined scenarios. Therefore, as
with the autobiographical events experienced on day 1 and tested
on day 2, the imagined scenarios constructed on day 1 were also
tested on day 2 (see Table 3).
In the ﬁrst instance, the recalled scenarios were scored for con-
tent in the same way as during their initial creation, i.e., in terms of
entities present (EP), sensory descriptions (SD), thoughts, emotions
and actions (TEA), and spatial references (SPA). The groups did not
differ signiﬁcantly on any category (EP F=2.69, P=0.11; SD F=0.18,
P=0.18; TEA F=0.16, P=0.15; SPA F=1.88, P=0.18). On the face of
it, it appeared that perhaps the memories of these imagined sce-
narios were preserved while the autobiographical memories were
not. However, our next two measures revealed that this was not
the case.
The ﬁrst measure was a reproducibility rating which wasSensory descriptions 3.29 (1.73) 3.93 (1.14)
Thoughts, emotions, actions 3.1 (1.37) 3.93 (1.74)
Scorer reproducibility rating 5.59 (1.68)* 6.81 (1.06)
New information 0.56 (0.56)* 0.26 (0.24)
* Signiﬁcantly different to controls.
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ical to the original construction’). The reproducibility rating for
he patients was signiﬁcantly lower (F=4.73, P=0.038) than that
or the controls. This suggests that during recall, the patients were
ot necessarily recalling the original imagined scenario, but were
reating a variant of the original or a new scenario. This ﬁnding
as supported by another measure – a count of the number of
lements that truly deviated from the original constructed scene.
his showed that the patient group included more new informa-
ion in the ‘recalled’ scenarios than controls (F=4.05, P=0.05). As to
he introduction of new material when recalling autobiographical
vents, the difference between the group scores only approached
tatistical signiﬁcance (F=3.48; P=0.072), suggesting that genera-
ion of new material was speciﬁc to scene construction.
.4. Relationships between the variables
In the patient group we also examined whether there were any
orrelations between performance on our autobiographical mem-
ry test andscoresonour sceneconstruction task, andhippocampal
olumes and the standardized memory quotient (MQ, Children’s
emory Scale). Mean hippocampal volumes in the patients corre-
ated positively with measures from our autobiographical memory
ecall task – event description scores (right hippocampus r=0.65,
= 0.002; left hippocampus r=0.55, P=0.012), and accuracy ratings
right hippocampus r=0.52, P=0.018; left hippocampus r=0.46,
= 0.043). Thus, the poorer the autobiographical memory, the
maller thehippocampal volume. Therewasno signiﬁcant relation-
hip between scene construction scores and hippocampal volumes,
hich is not surprising, given that patientswereunimpairedon this
ask and variance was low.
Measures from our autobiographical memory test correlated
ositively with the MQ (location/time r=0.47, P<0.045; accuracy
ating r=0.55, P<0.014). Similarly, the reproducibility score from
he ‘recall’ of imagined scenarios on day 2 also correlated with the
Q score (r=0.53, P<0.021). Thus the higher the MQ, the better
he score for recall of real-world events and for recall of imagined
cenarios, demonstrating consistency across the different memory
easures.
There were no signiﬁcant correlations between our autobi-
graphical memory measures and performance on the scene
onstruction task. Again, this is not surprising, given that patients
ere signiﬁcantly impaired on the former, butwere unimpaired on
he latter.
. Discussion
While there has been a good deal of research on autobiograph-
cal memory in adults (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001;
preng et al., 2009; Svoboda et al., 2006), much less attention has
een focused on autobiographical memory in school-aged children
Bauer et al., 2007; Peterson, Grant, & Boland, 2005; Picard et al.,
010; Piolino et al., 2007; Van Abbema & Bauer, 2005), despite its
mportance for development and subsequent independent living.
erewedevised a novel naturalistic autobiographicalmemory task
nd found that school-aged children (mean age of 12 years) could
ecall the events in detail, including spatiotemporal information
nd speciﬁc episodic details. This was in contrast to a group of
hildren with neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia and bilateral hippocam-
al volume reduction in whom recall was impaired, with speciﬁc
etails of the episodes lost.While there is a relatively limited literature on autobiographi-
al memory in school-aged children, even less is known formally
bout their ability to imagine ﬁctitious experiences, despite its
lear importance in planning future actions. We found that
ealthy school-aged children could construct scenarioswhichweregia 49 (2011) 1843–1850
rich, vivid and spatially coherent. Interestingly, despite having
a signiﬁcant autobiographical memory deﬁcit, the children with
hippocampal damage were unimpaired at constructing imagined
experiences. This is in clear contrast to patients with adult-onset
hippocampal damage and amnesia, who are typically impaired at
scene construction (Hassabis et al., 2007b).
Our novel test, permitting the naturalistic experiencing of real-
world events in an incidental fashion, and their subsequent probing
in a surprise memory test allowed us to conﬁrm that by (mean) age
12, recall of recent autobiographical memories is well developed.
While severe hypoxia/ischaemia and concomitant hippocampal
damage in children still permits the generation of an overall
description of an autobiographical event, this lacks a spatiotempo-
ral context and the speciﬁc details that make it truly episodic and
precisely accurate. This is additional evidence that the hippocam-
pus plays a crucial role in episodic recollection (Maguire, 2001;
Mishkin, Vargha-Khadem, & Gadian, 1998; Nadel & Moscovitch,
1997; Tulving, 2002; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003). Our ﬁnding of
signiﬁcant correlations between hippocampal volume and mea-
sures fromourautobiographicalmemory task,withpoorermemory
associated with decreased hippocampal volume, underscores this
further. The performance of the children with hypoxia/ischaemia
was in fact similar to younger healthy children reported by Bauer
et al. (2007). They found that between the ages of 7 and 10 years
gist or fact-based information predominated during recall of per-
sonal events, with few details pertaining to the spatiotemporal
context. This suggests that if episodic recollection emerges along
a trajectory, then early hippocampal damage interferes with this
development and leads to a plateauing of this ability before the
onset of adolescence.
It is all the more surprising, therefore, that the children with
hippocampal damage and impaired memory for personal episodes
were able to imagine ﬁctitious experiences. Moreover, when asked
to recall previously created scenarios, they in fact created essen-
tially new constructions, thus eschewing their memory recall
problems, instead relying on their intact ability to construct. This
ability could help the children to ‘ﬁll-in’ the gaps in their memory
andmaymake itmore difﬁcult to detect the extent of theirmemory
problems in daily life. Thus in a large group of children who had
experienced neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia with concomitant hip-
pocampal damage, scene construction appears unimpaired. This
accords with the previous case report of patient Jon, with develop-
mental amnesia, who had a similar proﬁle of memory impairment
and intact scene construction (Maguire et al., 2010). We therefore
conclude that intact scene construction is a consistent and reliable
feature of bilateral hippocampal damage sustained in childhood,
and developmental amnesia. This is clearly different to patients
with hippocampal damage and amnesia acquired in adulthood,
where in the main they are signiﬁcantly impaired at imagining ﬁc-
titious experiences. As noted earlier, ﬁndings in one DA patient, HC
(Kwanetal., 2010) seemto runcontrary to theother22patients (Jon
and the current paediatric patients), and work is currently under-
way to examine the anomalous ﬁnding in this patient further (E.A.
Maguire personal communication).
The question that naturally arises is what underpins the
patients’ intact scene construction? Jon described his ability to
construct scenes as something that he had worked on over the
years (Maguire et al., 2010). Thus it could be that the patients were
using strategies to enhance their ability, or compensatory strate-
gies to circumvent their problem. We think it unlikely, however,
that the children (some of whom were as young as 9 years old)
were engaged in active or conscious strategies, as none of them
declared this when probed.
The children, as inpreviouslydocumentedcasesofdevelopmen-
tal amnesia, haddeveloped IQs in thenormal range. This shows that
their semantic knowledge base was intact, and perhaps this was
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ufﬁcient to permit successful scene construction. The fact that the
hildrenwere able to acquire semantic knowledge in the face of sig-
iﬁcant hippocampal damage sustained very early in life suggests
here is a mechanism for such learning that is not solely dependent
n episodic/autobiographical memory. It may be that this mecha-
ism is also able to sustain scene construction, although the nature
f such a mechanism is still debated (Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, &
ishkin, 2001; Mishkin et al., 1998; Squire & Zola, 1998; Tulving
Markowitsch, 1998). If this is the case, then it will be impor-
ant in future studies to ascertain how more semantically based
cene construction can be differentiated from scene construction
hat involves true visualisation. Interestingly, this distinction can
nd has been readily made by adult patients with amnesia, who
re very clear that they cannot visualise a scene, even though they
re able to produce semantically relevant content (Hassabis et al.,
007b). Given that DA patients sustained such early hippocampal
amage, and may never have known what it is like to truly imagine
scene or event, then in the absence of any comparator, it is per-
aps not surprising that they consider their scene constructions to
e coherent.
While semantic memory may be the basis of intact scene con-
truction in our paediatric patients,Maguire et al. (2010) suggested
hat Jon’s ability to construct imagined scenariosmay be supported
y some functioning of his residual hippocampal tissue. Although
is hippocampi are reduced in volume by 50%, they were never-
heless activated during fMRI when he recalled some of the few
utobiographical memories that he retains. Interestingly, the one
atientwithadult-acquiredhippocampaldamageandamnesia that
as intact scene construction (P01 – Hassabis et al., 2007b, also
nown as KN – Aggleton et al., 2005; McKenna and Gerhand, 2002),
howed fMRI activity in the residual tissue of his right hippocam-
us during a memory task. It is therefore possible that the children
ithhippocampaldamage in thepresent study retained some func-
ionality in their residual hippocampal tissue which was sufﬁcient
o support scene construction, but not enough for accurate and
etailed autobiographical memory.
In this study we have described the effect of early hippocam-
al damage on autobiographical memory and scene construction
n children. It is clear that future studies assessing patients such
s these [and indeed Jon (Maguire et al., 2010) and P01 (Hassabis
t al., 2007b)] should involve fMRI during scene construction in
rder to establish if residual hippocampal tissue is active, whether
dditional brain areas are recruited or up-regulated, or a com-
letely different set of brain regions is engaged compared with
ontrols. To our knowledge, there are no published fMRI studies of
utobiographical memory/imagining ﬁctitious experiences in chil-
ren with hippocampal pathology, or in fact any involving healthy
hildren. This is surprising, given that understanding how such
ritical cognitive functions develop in the ﬁrst place may provide
ey insights into their functional neuroanatomy, and we urge the
eployment of fMRI in this developmental context.
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